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ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTIFICATION AND SERENDIPITOUS VALUE CREATION 
IN POST ACQUISITION INTEGRATION 
This study tells the story of two acquisitions made by a company we call Multifirm.  Multifirm 
acquired two targets, Datagon and Teknico. The Datagon employees immediately identified with 
Multifirm and the integration process was characterized by few conflicts and satisfied 
employees. The Teknico employees, on the other hand, failed to identify with Multifirm, and the 
integration process was fraught with disruptions and conflicts. Contrary to conventional wisdom 
of identity threats, Multifirm reported that more value was created from the acquisition of 
Teknico than from Datagon. In this paper, we try to understand why this was the case.  
The objective of an acquisition is to create value. Value can be created through the integration of 
the target and acquiring firms’ organizations and activities (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991, 
Birkinshaw, Bresman & Håkanson, 2000). Graebner (2004) differentiates between expected and 
serendipitous value. Expected value motivates the deal, whereas serendipitous value arises 
primarily from the sharing of knowledge between the target and acquirer during the integration 
process, which can result in new, superior but unexpected procedures and processes.  
Acquisitions, by definition, broaden and transform organizational boundaries, and often 
represent a threat to the pre-acquisition identity of the target. Identity threats are negatively 
related to value creation (Brown & Starkey, 2000; Nag, Corley, & Gioia, 2007). Employees 
protect their self-esteem through the continuity of their existing identity, and subsequently, they 
are unwilling to contribute to the new organization. Studies that have focused on the link 
between identity and acquisition outcomes suggest that identification with the new, integrated 
organization leads to high employee satisfaction and performance (Terry, 2003; Terry & O'Brien, 
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2001; Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005).  The relation between identity and value creation is, 
however, understudied in the context of post-acquisition integration (Nag et al., 2007). 
In this exploratory case study, we examine how identity influences the outcomes of acquisitions. 
Our findings challenge conventional wisdom that identity threats negatively influence post 
acquisition performance. We find that threats to identity lead to lower perceived satisfaction, but 
that it also facilitates serendipitous value creation. Identity threats push target employees to 
demonstrate knowledge and solutions of their pre-acquisition unit that they assess as superior to 
their acquirers’. We argue that identification with the former owner stimulates employees to 
resist the adoption of processes and structures they judge inferior and provides them with the 
confidence to preserve and promote their “old” and more innovative capabilities in the “new” 
organization.  
THEORY FOUNDATION 
Organizational identification is defined as “the perception of oneness with or belongingness to an 
organization” (Mael & Ashforth, 1992:104). Social categorization and self-enhancement are 
central to the understanding of organizational identification. Social categorization refers to how 
people define themselves as belonging to different groups, whereas self-enhancement suggests 
that individuals need to maintain a positive sense of self derived from the social groups they 
belong to (Terry, 2003). Acquisition integration represents a confrontation of two groups. It may 
challenge the identities of both target and acquirer by questioning valued identity attributes of the 
pre-acquisition organizations. These encounters may result in in-group biases, prejudices, and 
stereotyping (Tajfel & Turner, 1985). Researchers have studied how identity shapes the 
responses to mergers (Hogg & Terry, 2000), the impact of the sense of continuity on post merger 
identification (Ullrich et al., 2005) and the role of continued task activity in post-merger 
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integration (Van Dick et al., 2004). From a social identity viewpoint, identification with the 
acquiring firm reduces competitiveness between the units (“us” and “them” dynamics), increases 
commitment, and is therefore positively related to acquisition outcomes. However, if the target 
firm employees maintain their pre-acquisition identity, in-group biases, hostility and resistance 
lower outcomes (Graves, 1981). When the acquirer is seen as legitimate, attractive, with higher 
status, and as representing a chance to continue with ongoing tasks, employees will more likely 
identify with the acquirer, and chances are higher that the post-integration process will be 
successful (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Van Dick et al., 2004). Consequently, there seems to be a 
strong agreement within the existing literature that identification with the acquirer is positively 
linked to acquisition performance primarily because of reduced conflicts and hostility towards 
the acquirer.  
Acquisitions represent possibilities for firms to learn, broaden their knowledge base and renew 
capabilities (Haspeslagh & Jemison 1991; Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Zollo & Singh, 2004). 
Acquisitions generate value due to organizational renewal (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001) and 
knowledge transfer (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Bresman, Birkinshaw, & Nobel, 1999). Exploration 
processes (March 1991; Levinthal & March 1993) are particularly important in an acquisition 
because the integration process allows closeness to new knowledge (from the target) in a 
situation of organizational redefinition (Ranft & Lord, 2002). This situation creates opportunities 
to get new ideas and ask critical questions challenging old ways of doing things. In any social 
group, certain routines are taken-for-granted, and if a new person enters, he or she may challenge 
these ideas, which in itself represents a new source of knowledge. In a quick integration there is 
little opportunity to challenge and explore new learning. This limits knowledge transfer of tacit 
and socially complex knowledge (Coff, 1999) because the social structures that contain these 
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resources are altered (Ranft & Lord, 2002).  In this manner target employees’ identification with 
the acquiring firm may fuel the willingness to socialize and thereby limit potential learning 
opportunities. 
We argue that social identity mechanisms may be contingencies for value creation in 
acquisitions. In integration processes there is high information asymmetry as managers of the 
acquiring firm have more knowledge about acquiring managers, structures and solutions than of 
those in the target firm. There will therefore be biases towards appointing employees from the 
acquiring firm to fill key management roles, and a tendency to continue with solutions from the 
acquiring firm.  Consequently, we suggest that self confidence and perceived superiority through 
weak identification with the new owner empower target employees to overcome barriers of 
asymmetry and “push” their knowledge into the new organization, and subsequently they will 
more likely contribute to the creation of value.  
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
We chose an exploratory case approach to study identity threats and outcomes (Yin, 1984, 
Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2002) because we wanted to understand how initial identity orientation 
affected acquisition outcomes over time. Furthermore, we wanted to be open towards the views 
and experiences of each respondent, and allow each person to use their own narratives to 
describe the integration process.  Qualitative methods are well suited to account for 
organizational members’ accounts and interpretations (Maitlis, 2005).  
It is difficult to decide how early one can appropriately categorize an acquisition as a success or 
a failure. The first year is usually turbulent, with the implementation of a new organization and 
high turnover. Subsequently, the organization will settle, people meet and learn about each other 
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and realize synergies. We argue that after approximately 2 years, the major turbulence in 
acquisitions is mostly over and we can start to detect more permanent effects. In our case, the 
acquirer supported our claim that different outcomes from the two acquisitions could be seen two 
years into the process.  We therefore suggest that if people at this point are generally unsatisfied 
or feel that they have learned very little, it is reasonable that the overall acquisition has and will 
create less value also the future.  
Multifirm is a leading Norwegian IT-service group and employs about 2500 people. Multifirm 
follows an explicit strategy of growth through acquisitions, and has over the last few years 
acquired approximately 20 companies both internationally and domestically. The targets Teknico 
and Datagon were chosen because they were relatively similar firms, acquired during the same 
time period, and followed a similar formal integration pattern. Furthermore, the company 
provided us with unusual access (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007).  The targets were similar in 
strategic rationale, type of business, and mode of integration, and provided an excellent starting 
point for comparison of the integration processes as well as outcomes. Both acquisitions were 
cash based, and both deals transferred important customer contracts to Multifirm. The 
employees’ ages, experiences and competence levels were confirmed similar in both targets by 
Multifirm HR management.  
Teknico (450 employees) and Datagon (300 employees) were former units in technology 
intensive multinational companies; one headquartered in Norway (Teknico) and the other in the 
US (Datagon) however both targets were localized in Norway.  The motive behind both deals 
was access to competences, products and customers.  Teknico brought one important customer 
and the products and competences were in the due diligence process seen as quite overlapping to 
Multifirm. Datagon came with a whole new customer segment as well as new products, but the 
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basic technology and competencies were similar to those of Multifirm. The two integration 
processes followed a similar, strict information protocol with involvement of the targets. 
Multifirm established a transition project for each acquisition, with representatives from the 
relevant operational units, human resources and the communication department. In the Teknico 
acquisition, Multifirm early on announced downsizing that included employees from both 
Multifirm and Teknico. Datagon, however, was not initially threatened by downsizing, but 
employees were aware that the business logic of Multifirm prioritized cost-cutting and 
efficiency, including downsizing as a part of normal business. About 8 months after the transfer 
of Teknico, and about 2 months after the transfer of Datagon, a new organizational structure that 
included the two acquisitions was implemented and the two targets were co-localized at 
Multifirm headquarters. Employees from both targets mixed with Multifirm employees into joint 
teams.   
Our data include interviews, conversations, annual reports, reports from Multifirm employee 
surveys, company web-sites and other documents made available to the researchers. The main 
data source, however, is the 61 interviews of 47 respondents performed in Multifirm, Teknico 
and Datagon (some key respondents were interviewed twice). These data were collected over a 
period of 24 months, beginning immediately after the initial announcement of the acquisitions. 
Figure 1 displays the timeline of the acquisitions and Table 1 the distribution of the interviews: 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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We organized the data collection in two phases in each case: immediately following the 
announcement of the deal, and approximately 2 years into the integration process. Each 
interview lasted between 1-2 hours and was tape-recorded. We received suggestions from the 
company of initial key respondents. They suggested other people to talk to, and we kept 
interviewing until perceived saturation. We picked respondents from different functional areas 
and organizational levels and from both target and acquirer organizations, representing a variety 
of viewpoints. This process limits biases from retrospective sensemaking and impression 
management, as it is more unlikely that a varied sample of informants represent the same biases 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
In the first phase, we primarily accessed information of the employees’ perceptions of their own 
firms and the target/acquirer,   structure and organizational culture, the history of their firm 
(either target or acquirer), knowledge of the target or acquiring firm, and their perceptions of the 
initial phase after the acquisition announcement. Interviews were intentionally kept open, as we 
wanted each respondent to talk about their work-life in their pre-acquisition organization, their 
feelings for the old and new organization, and their expectations towards the new organization.  
After about 2 years we revisited the companies. At this time, the targets were organizationally 
integrated and co-localized. We focused on how they perceived the integration process, roles of 
the target and acquiring firms, as well as outcomes of the acquisition so far. These interviews 
primarily gave insight into the integration process as well as the outcomes of the acquisitions. 
We held two presentations of preliminary findings for managers in Multifirm. This was very 
useful to validate our interpretations of the integration processes. In addition, we used 
observations and analysis of documents to triangulate the interview data. 
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The interviews made up about 1600 pages of double-spaced text. We started the analysis by 
writing out a detailed case story of each acquisition dividing each story in 3 phases: the pre-
acquisition context, the post-acquisition integration process and outcomes of the acquisition. 
Then we looked for key themes, using Atlas.ti to organize core and recurrent expressions, like 
identity, belonging, status and well functioning structures and processes. We grouped raw data 
that contained key expressions into categories (Coffey, 1996), and labeled them first order 
themes (Nag et al., 2007). In this process, we first looked at the raw data and their categories, but 
later we consulted established concepts from the identity and M&A literatures, like status (Terry 
& O'Brien, 2001, Podolny, 2005), mitigating and mobilizing actions (Graebner, 2004) and 
serendipitous value creation (Graebner, 2004). Using previous theory, as well as the nature of the 
integration process, we collapsed the first order themes into second order categories that we 
further combined into overarching categories. For instance, identity orientation and status are 
categories from the early phase triggering identity threats. Hence, we defined identity threat the 
overarching category. Similarly, in line with Graebner (2004), target efforts in integration 
processes can be portrayed as mitigating and mobilizing. Finally, we can term acquisition 
performance perceived satisfaction and serendipitous value. In this sense, we identified the 
categories and dimensions of analysis by reading and rereading the interview transcripts 
juxtaposing them with existing theory. This contributes to the depth, openness and detail that are 
benefits from qualitative inquiry (Patton, 1990:13). The structure of the data is presented in 
figure 2. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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During the last step of the process we searched our data for evidence of relationships between 
these categories, in line with axial coding described by Corley and Gioia (2004). The validity of 
our research depends on whether the parameters and the context of the study are explicitly 
accounted for (Marshall & Rossmann 1999). External validity in case studies refers to whether or 
not the findings in the study can be generalized beyond the case. The concept of organizational 
identity is not specific to Multifirm, and there is no reason to believe that similar processes 
should not evolve in other acquisition integration processes. More importantly, case studies rely 
on theoretical generalizations (Yin, 1984. Maxwell, 2005), and our propositions of these can be 
tested in other acquisitions in the future. Table 2 summarizes possible validity threats and the 
measures we applied to limit these in the study.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
TRIGGERS OF IDENTITY THREAT: IDENTITY ORIENTATION AND STATUS 
From the early information gathering we identified two first order concepts: identity orientation 
and status. If identity orientation is directed mostly towards the acquirer and the status of the 
acquirer is high, there are few threats to target identity. On the other hand, if the target‘s identity 
orientation is towards pre-acquisition unit, and the target considers the acquired firm’s status as 
low identity threats are high. Table 2 displays the quotes for identity orientation and status.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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Identity Orientation 
Identity orientation refers to the loci of self-definition (Brickson, 2000). In our data, the loci of 
self-definition (the definition of “we”) were either the former owner or the acquiring firm. We 
detected these “identifications with” in the informants’ stories of their heritage and their 
described feelings of belongingness to the organization.  
Teknico had developed through several earlier mergers as an internal IT-service unit in Teknico 
MNC. Many Teknico employees had worked in Teknico MNC for years, others their entire 
career. Teknico employees expressed a sense of belonging to Teknico. The basis for their 
identification with Teknico was the development of state-of-the-art technological platform, work 
processes and organizational culture. Teknico considered the acquisition as an opportunity for 
their business to get more focus belonging to a larger professional IT company. However, even 
though they appreciated the strategic rationale of the deal, they were still concerned that the 
acquisition was not the right decision for Teknico MNC, illustrating their strong sense of loyalty 
towards their former owner. 
Datagon MNC acquired the majority of Datagon employees 10 years earlier, but the locus of 
their identity was not Datagon MNC, but rather Datagon itself. They felt alienated from Datagon 
MNC as an organization, expressed nostalgic sympathies with former corporate owners, and 
approved of what they perceived to be the Multifirm culture. The alienation from Datagon MNC 
was materialized by language barriers and distance to where decisions were made. Becoming 
part of a Norwegian system was positive, as information would be in Norwegian and more 
readily available. Several Datagon respondents expressed the willingness to represent the 
distinguishing features, management style, and authority structures of Multifirm.  
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Datagon employees described the Datagon MNC decision structure as bureaucratic and they 
emphasized lack of individual decision power in Datagon MNC. They awaited a more 
“democratic” decision making structure and expected Multifirm to properly invest in the 
development of their products.  
Status 
Status refers to an organization’s position in a hierarchy of comparative organizations, in the 
context of an acquisition: the acquiring firm, target firm, or prior owner. We define status as a 
target’s perceived position or rank on dimensions defined by the target. Our data show that 
respondents referred to a variety of status dimensions such as technological innovation, 
autonomy granted to the employees, competencies and skills, organizational culture and 
attractiveness as an employer.  
Teknico employees described the acquisition as a move from an owner that was “young and 
cutting edge” to an owner that was “old-fashioned and sturdy”. However, from the HR 
department we learned that there were insignificant demographic differences between the firms. 
The assertion of their own superiority on some status dimensions, such as work processes, 
management competencies, and technology, can be interpreted in light of inferiority on other 
status dimensions such as their size (smaller than Multifirm) and poor financial results. Datagon 
employees raised very few concerns about Multifirm’s image or status. On the contrary, Datagon 
employees perceived Multifirm to have a high status as an employer. This feeling was attributed 
to the company culture, Norwegian headquarter control and the similarities they saw between 
former host companies (pre Datagon MNC) and Multifirm. They described the distinguishing 
features of Datagon MNC in negative terms, expected Multifirm to be a favourable owner, and 
looked forward to becoming a member of the Multifirm “family”.   
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TARGET CONTRIBUTION: MITIGATING AND MOBILIZING 
Approximately 18-24 months after the announcement of the deals, we studied the integration 
process and the actions of the targets’ managers and employees. We identified two categories of 
actions performed by target managers from the integration process; 1) actions to facilitate task 
integration, which we call mobilizing actions, and 2) mitigating actions performed to facilitate 
social integration.  We found more evidence of mobilizing actions among Teknico managers, 
and although both targets performed mitigating actions, they did it differently.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Mitigating actions 
Target employees must deal with a variety of post-acquisition changes, including new reporting 
structures, new office locations, new IT-systems and company policies. We found that managers 
in both Datagon and Teknico acted to shield their employees from these potential disruptions by 
performing mitigating actions such as providing information, communication and conflict-
solving.  However, the way these actions were performed differed.  
Even if Teknico employees worked in teams with Multifirm employees, the sense of belonging 
to Teknico was salient and supported by Teknico managers. Teknico had a strong and visible 
leader that provided information on the integration process and gave support to employees that 
experienced “harmful” integration attacks. They described how Teknico managers shared 
concerns about problems they experienced with Multifirm management, and actively took part in 
conflict solving among individual Teknico and Multifirm employees. We label these efforts self-
preserving mitigating actions. 
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Whereas the mitigating actions in Teknico at times were confrontational and noisy, Datagon 
managers tried to prevent conflicts and problems from impacting Datagon employees. Rather 
than sharing concerns with employees, they wanted to “make employees happy” and keep the 
positive spirit of the integration. The Datagon managers kept their frustrations on the 
management level, and did not involve the employees in the integration issues with Multifirm. In 
this manner, they appeared more loyal to the Multifirm organization and communicated a 
positive attitude to the rest of the organization. We have labelled these efforts complying 
mitigation. 
Mobilizing actions  
We found evidence of mobilizing actions in the descriptions of how the target employees and 
managers integrated systems, tasks and knowledge into Multifirm.  Teknico managers were 
visible and active in the integration process suggesting how their solutions could be integrated by 
promoting their prior knowledge and solutions. Multifirm managers portray these actions as a 
series of questions and challenges to existing Multifirm processes and routines. 
On the other hand, Multifirm reported that Datagon managers were reactive, and only limitedly 
took active steps to integrate systems and procedures from Datagon into the new organization. 
The Datagon managers described that their efforts to link activities to Multifirm were met with 
resistance and lack of support from the Multifirm system. Datagon managers attempted to 
suggest their ways of working, but were unsuccessful, and therefore abandoned these efforts.  
A salient issue at all levels of the organization was the perception of numbers of individuals from 
Teknico and Datagon in management positions. HR representatives in Multifirm reported that 
initially they considered the management potential in both Datagon and Teknico to be equal, but 
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after some time they found few with management drive in Datagon. They saw this as strange 
since Datagon MNC was a large, international corporation with extensive competence 
development, performance management and an elaborate career development system. It seems, 
however, as if Datagon managers in the integration process became passive and only limitedly 
put in effort to take on high level management positions.  
Teknico managers were more visible and active; and as such they were more likely to be 
appointed to management positions. Once they were in management roles, they were equipped 
with the information and leverage to manage integration between Teknico and Multifirm 
structures where Teknico knowledge was made visible.   
OUTCOMES OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS 
Both Datagon and Teknico delivered expected value according to their business case. However, 
when probed about the actual outcomes of the acquisitions in both financial and non-financial 
terms, the stories of the two acquisitions differed. The Teknico acquisition was described as a 
success in all areas and as a “star buy” by Multifirm managers, even though they pointed to the 
integration process as having been difficult. 
The Datagon acquisition delivered the bare minimum, although employee satisfaction was high.  
Their systems and solutions had a slightly lower quality than expected and their organization was 
a disappointment. The value of their public sector customer base and competencies, however, 
was as expected. Table 5 displays serendipitous value and employee satisfaction. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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Serendipitous value 
Serendipitous value refers to the unexpected benefits from the acquisition. We define this value 
as new processes and ways of doing things, unexpected technology solutions, new strategic ideas 
and organizational and cultural renewal.  
Multifirm managers reported that the Teknico acquisition impacted the Multifirm organization 
through the introduction of new work processes as well as challenges to the existing 
organizational culture. For instance, Teknico employees upgraded core service concepts, 
introduced a new sales procedure, and brought in modern project management processes. The 
quotations procedure was also improved through knowledge brought in by Teknico. 
Furthermore, Teknico employees impacted Multifirm by questioning existing norms, work-
processes and “how we do things around here”. Teknico employees focused on the “old-
fashioned” way of working at Multifirm, and insisted that their solutions were more modern and 
efficient.  
Whereas the acquisition of Datagon provided the competence and products expected some 
respondents focused on Datagon solutions as being in need of more development than Multifirm 
initially expected. This was a surprising finding as the value from Datagon had the potential to 
be at least equally high. They provided a new promising customer set, and had more 
complementary knowledge with Multifirm than Teknico. In addition, Datagon MNC was a large, 
successful, multinational organization, well known for its professional management and efficient 
structures. We would expect more learning from the complementary unit (Datagon) than from 
the more overlapping unit (Teknico). Datagon made an important contribution by bringing in a 
new customer set, but entering the new market was an expected outcome, and little value was 
described beyond the expected. On the contrary, the public sector business from Datagon was 
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over time taken over and developed further by “old” Multifirm employees and managers from 
subsequent acquisitions.  
Employee Satisfaction 
We account for employee satisfaction by using quotes from the interviews as well as reports 
from the employee satisfaction survey performed by Multifirm. Generally, Datagon employees 
were more satisfied than Teknico. Even though there was some unrest and dissatisfaction on the 
management level, the lower level managers appeared satisfied and socially integrated in the 
Multifirm organization. Datagon employees appreciated Multifirm as an employer. They were 
satisfied with Multifirm’s culture and “way of doing things”. The retention rate was 79% after 
approximately 2 years, and Datagon was perceived as a lenient target in the integration process.  
The Teknico integration process was more fraught with conflicts. The Teknico employees were 
not happy to be acquired and were more unsatisfied with the integration process. In Teknico, 
more key personnel left because of dissatisfaction with the Multifirm system. Even so, the 
retention rate in Teknico was 72% after 2 years. The fact that the retention rate was not lower 
was argued to be because the market for Teknico competency was not very good, leaving 
unhappy employees with few exit opportunities.  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDENTITY THREAT, TARGET CONTRIBUTION 
AND ACQUISITION OUTCOMES 
Our data illustrate potential links between identity threats, target manager actions and acquisition 
outcomes. The Teknico employees strongly identified with their former owner and target group 
(identity orientation), felt that their organizational culture, knowledge, processes and technology 
were superior to that of Multifirm (status), which provided threats to their identity  (identity 
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threats). Responding to these threats, managers and employees (from the acquired unit Teknico) 
took an active role in promoting their knowledge, technology and processes (mobilizing actions) 
in the new organization and the managers actively dealt with employee’ concerns (self-serving 
mitigation) focusing on the promotion of Teknico as a unit. The Teknico acquisition brought a 
new way of working, which energized and improved Multifirm routines (serendipitous value 
creation). However, there was more disruption and a general feeling of distrust, lack of pride and 
negative attitudes to both the integration process and being acquired by Multifirm (employee 
satisfaction). 
The Datagon employees immediately identified with Multifirm (identity orientation), expressed 
admiration for the Multifirm organization and culture, and ranked Multifirm more favourably 
than their former owner (status). Subsequently, the acquisition did not pose a threat to their 
identity (identity threat).  Over time, former Datagon employees were seen as passive and 
inconspicuous in the new organization, and they themselves described few initiatives to perform 
task integration (mobilizing) Some Datagon managers, however, protected employees from the 
“noise” and disruption of the acquisition and sheltered their employees from the conflicts and 
ambiguities of post-acquisition integration (complying mitigation). From the Datagon 
acquisition, there were few signs of organizational renewal, new work processes or other benefits 
(serendipitous value). However, Datagon employees generally were positive towards the 
acquisition, the way the integration process had been handled and enjoyed working for Multifirm 
(employee satisfaction).  
Identity threats triggering mobilizing action 
Teknico managers and employees felt their identity was threatened by the acquisition. They 
expected that they would be part of a firm with a lower status, inferior work processes and an 
18 
unattractive image. As their self-perception was threatened, they increased their self-
enhancement activities in the integration process. Simply accepting the Multifirm work processes 
that they perceived as “old fashioned and backwards” would leave them with an organization 
characterized by less attractive attributes; hence they were motivated to act.  
According to social identity theory, people react to identity threats to preserve the distinctiveness 
and attractiveness of their group (Haslam 2004), and protect and restore their identities (Dutton 
and Dukerich 1991). These self enhancing actions include emphasizing valued identity attributes, 
such as competency, knowledge, technology or culture. Target managers act to include these 
valued attributes as part of the new merged organization to restore attractiveness. Our data 
suggest that when the identity of a target unit is threatened, the unit will mobilize what they see 
as their own strengths to protect and restore their own identity. Our findings are in line with 
social identity theory, as we found that target employees respond to identity threats by acting to 
preserve their identity.  
Proposition 1: Identity threat is positively related to mobilizing actions 
Mobilizing actions and serendipitous value creation 
Teknico managers actively linked their activities to Multifirm by contacting Multifirm 
counterparts to find ways to latch their activities onto Multifirm. They inquired about how 
Multifirm did things, challenged the way Multifirm conducted their business and fronted their 
own solutions, knowledge and technology. In doing so they conveyed their knowledge, solutions 
and technologies. These mobilizing activities accelerate task integration and contribute to 
serendipitous value creation in the form of new work processes, technologies, and organizational 
and cultural renewal in Multifirm. In Datagon, on the other hand, managers did not mobilize 
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successfully, and little unexpected value was detected because no one stepped forward to defend 
and promote Datagon core knowledge and solutions.   
Graebner (2004) found that target managers are critical for value creation because of their deep 
knowledge of target firm resources and competencies. Managers from the acquirer lack this deep 
knowledge, and this information asymmetry prevents effective integration. Target managers play 
a significant role in bridging information asymmetry by making target resources known and 
providing facilitation in the integration process. Integration is not only structural, but also 
cultural and symbolic (Ranft and Lord 2002), and keeping some distance between the target and 
the acquiring firm if only in symbolic terms may preserve socially complex knowledge. 
Consequently, when target managers take an active role in the post-acquisition processes, 
sufficient boundaries are created around target knowledge so that it is preserved and later 
transferred. In this sense, the overall structural integration may proceed as long as target 
managers are strong enough to shelter core resources of the target firm.  
Studies have shown that actions to preserve identity inhibit strategic change (Fiol and O'Connor 
2002) and restrict learning (Gagliardi 1986). Previous studies also suggest that merging units 
with different identities will resist knowledge sharing (Empson 2001; 2004). In other words; this 
literature concludes that identity threats are negatively related to value creation. Our findings 
contradict this by showing that identity threats trigger mobilizing actions that facilitate task 
integration and subsequently the creation of serendipitous value.  
Proposition 2: Mobilizing actions are positively related to serendipitous value creation 
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Identity threats and mitigating actions  
In Datagon the immediate identification with the Multifirm organization made self-enhancement 
and actions to preserve the existing Datagon identity unnecessary. The distinctiveness of the 
Datagon organization was not threatened; on the contrary it was emphasized as compatible with 
Multifirm. Even though the acquisition didn’t threaten Datagon’s identity, the integration process 
still produced uncertainties for Datagon employees. The Datagon managers reported that they 
dealt with these frustrations at management level, and protected the employees from the 
disruption and eased the impact of the integration on the employees. Datagon managers 
encouraged social integration with Multifirm, by emphasizing the attractiveness of Multifirm as 
an organization, and focusing on the positive aspects of the integration. This led to complying 
mitigation focusing on calming the organization by promoting social integration with the 
Multifirm organization.  
In Teknico, identity threats led to actions to preserve identity by enhancing the central and 
distinct features of Teknico, and juxtaposing them with the perceived attributes of Multifirm. 
The Teknico managers emphasized Teknico features and reassured the employees that these 
would continue post-acquisition, thus easing employees’ concerns in the integration process. The 
way these concerns were addressed was through enhancing and promoting the Teknico identity 
in Multifirm. These actions did not facilitate human integration or develop a sense of belonging 
with Multifirm, rather they kept the Teknico identity salient and demarcated the social categories 
of Teknico and Multifirm. Teknico managers mitigated and eased employees concerns, but they 
did it in a manner that was confrontational. They emphasized Teknico as a separate social 
category, even though they were structurally integrated in Multifirm.  
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Prior research on acquisitions show that threats to organizational identity cause disruption and 
conflicts in post-acquisition integration (Empson, 2001; Ullrich et al., 2005). When target 
managers perform mitigating actions in the integration process, this reduces tensions and eases 
target employees concerns. The complying mitigating actions facilitated social integration with 
the acquirer in the Datagon case, whereas the mitigating actions seemed to preserve the pre-
acquisition unity in Teknico which prevented social integration. Our findings show that target 
managers have different motivations for performing mitigating actions depending on the level of 
identity threat. When the threat is high, mitigating actions become self-preserving aiming at 
continuing with the pre-acquisition identity, whereas when the threat is low mitigating actions 
are complying aiming at providing human integration between the two units. However, both 
types of actions intend to ease employees’ concerns.  
Proposition 3: Identity threat is positively related to a) self-preserving mitigation and negatively 
to b) complying mitigation 
Mitigation and employee satisfaction 
In Teknico, we observed that mitigating actions that preserved and enhanced pre-acquisition 
identity were unfavourable to employee satisfaction. Teknico managers openly discussed 
integration problems and challenged the acquirer which made target employees aware of 
negative issues in the new firm, remembering more “happy days” in Teknico MNC. This is in 
line with social identity theory predicting that lack of identification leads to lower employee 
satisfaction (Terry, 2003).  Social integration will not take place when management actively 
support pre-acquisition identity, and social integration is critical for employee satisfaction 
(Birkinshaw et al 2000).  
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Proposition 4: Self-preserving mitigation is negatively related to employee satisfaction 
In the Datagon integration process, we observed that actions to shield employees led to a 
relatively smooth integration process and satisfied employees. Datagon managers focused on 
protecting the employees from the disruptions in the integration process. They conveyed the 
Multifirm identity and culture to Datagon employees as a continuation of their former owner’s 
identity and culture, promoting social integration. They focused on the positive aspects of the 
acquisition, and eased employees concerns about the changes the acquisition implied for them. In 
this manner they supported the development of satisfied employees. 
This finding is supported by social identity theory as continuity for the target employees is 
beneficial for the acquisition integration (Ullrich et al. 2005). Managers that mitigate in a 
complying way shield their employees from the disruptions of the integration process, leading to 
a smoother integration process and higher employee satisfaction. Studies have shown that 
reducing intergroup conflict is beneficial for employee well being and morale, and as such for 
the outcome of the merger (Terry, 2003). 
Proposition 5: Complying mitigation is positively related to employee satisfaction 
Graebner (2004) also found a negative relation between mitigation and turnover as well as 
disruptions. We further specify the orientation of mitigation and argue that self preserving 
mitigation preserves and promotes pre-merger identity whereas complying mitigation facilitates 
social integration in the new organization. We find that complying mitigation leads to the effects 
described by Graebner, whereas self-preserving mitigation has the opposite effect.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
         -------------------------------- 
23 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our study challenges conventional wisdom that identity threats are negative for value creation in 
acquisitions. We find that in some cases the opposite is actually true. Identity threats may 
facilitate serendipitous value creation, whereas immediate identification with the acquirer creates 
more satisfied employees.  These findings dispute acquisition studies based on social identity 
theory that claim that it is necessary to create a common identity to get value from acquisitions. 
We advocate a more nuanced view as identity threats may have both positive and negative 
implications.  Our findings confirm that when the target identifies with the acquirer, the 
integration process is smooth, and there are few conflicts and high employee satisfaction (Van 
Dick et al, 2004, Hogg and Terry, 2000, Ullrich et al 2005). This situation describes a process 
where the target quickly gets absorbed into the acquirer and synergies can be exploited. In our 
study, this was the case for Datagon. It led to expected results, satisfied employees, but little 
value beyond the expected. The Teknico case, on the other hand, demonstrated identity threats, 
but also unexpected value creation. We think these findings have at least three interesting 
theoretical implications, concerning both identity threats and the acquisition process.  
First, identity threats make acquired employees more inclined to act.  This is in line with 
Ellemers, De Gilder & Haslam (2004) who propose that when individuals must identify with a 
collective, they become energized when their inclusion in this collective is not acknowledged. 
Hence, when employees feel that the new collective does not recognize their superiority, they 
will act to preserve their current identity. Teknico employees felt their identity threatened by 
Multifirm, and this stimulated action to preserve the solutions they saw as superior.  
Secondly, the acts from Teknico managers and employees created “noise” and conflicts. Several 
studies have shown that such disruptions may be positive for a learning outcome. Andreade et al 
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(2008) argue that conflicts present an opportunity to improvise and try something new that will 
improve the organization. Conflicts may represent a source of creativity (Heifetz & Laurie, 
2001). In addition, conflicts urge managers to act mindfully and be more sensitive to enhance 
chances of success. These findings also support the notion that dialectic inquiry facilitates 
learning better than consensus methods (Brickson, 2000; Dean & Sharfman, 1993).  
Third, acts based on identity threats require direction, support and guidance through active (self-
preserving) mitigation and mobilization. Previous research (Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; 
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991, Coff, 1999) suggest that a quick “seamless” structural integration 
risk that  integration managers oversee complex, tacit resources from the target simply because 
of asymmetric information; they have less information about the target than of themselves.  This 
issue points to the critical role of target managers as promoters of target resources (Graebner, 
2004). Target managers are informed of target knowledge, and can ensure that acts from target 
employees become more than individual initiatives. In the Teknico case, target managers 
performed self-preserving mitigation. They provided emotional support as well as information 
which kept target employees up to date on where and how their resources and competences could 
be used. Target managers also mobilized, which helped organize the acts from individual target 
employees and ensured better chances of implementation in the Multifirm system.  Ranft and 
Lord (2002) suggest that cultural and symbolic autonomy may preserve socially complex 
knowledge embodied in a target firm. We extend these notions and argue that target managers 
secure cultural and symbolic autonomy through mobilizing and self-preserving mitigation. 
Teknico employees were physically integrated in Multifirm, but the mitigating and mobilizing 
actions of Teknico managers preserved knowledge as well as provided avenues for this 
knowledge into the Multifirm organization. Birkinshaw et al. (2000) argue that value is created 
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through an interaction of social and task integration. We propose that this interaction process 
may benefit from disruptions created by identity threats supported by target manager’s self 
preserving mitigation and mobilization.  
Our findings extend Graebner’s (2004) framework, as we suggest that identity threats stimulate 
mobilizing and mitigating actions. In her framework, these are independent tasks, while in our 
study these tasks are linked to identity threats. Furthermore, we argue that mitigating actions can 
be self-preserving or compliant. Compliant mitigation creates a smooth transition and conflict 
free environment for employees. Self-preserving mitigation supports target employee’s pre 
merger identity. We have argued that self-preserving mitigation better facilitate knowledge 
transfer because it encourages initiatives, whereas compliant mitigation eases conflicts.  Our 
study observes outcomes after two years. It could be argued that the positive short-term effects 
from self-preserving mitigation could have possible negative long term effects.  Over time, 
negative attitudes towards the new organization may eventually overshadow the positive effects 
of learning. The long time effects of identity threats and self-preserving mitigation is therefore an 
important topic for further study.   
Future studies should also investigate the shape of the relation between identity threat and value, 
as this link most likely is not strictly linear. Based on our two cases, we argue that at some point 
the link is positive, but it seems likely that if identity threat becomes too high it is impossible to 
create learning synergies based on knowledge initiatives from the target. Future studies should 
aim to identify which levels of identity threats that have positive effects, and when they turn to 
be negative.  
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We also encourage studies that investigate the role of alternative explanations of learning in 
acquisitions and how these are linked to identity threats. One factor could be more motivation to 
share knowledge; another could be degree of knowledge overlap. In our case there was no initial 
indication that Teknico was more motivated to share knowledge, actually we thought the 
opposite as Teknico had developed as an internal IT unit whereas Datagon had served external 
customers and therefore better mastered marketing skills. Teknico came to Multifirm with more 
knowledge overlaps than Datagon, which should give less learning.  A third alternative 
explanation is prior expectations. Teknico could have been underappreciated at the outset, and 
Datagon the opposite, although we find no evidence of this assumption in the data. These three 
factors of motivation, knowledge overlap and prior expectations are valuable starting points for 
future studies in this area. 
Most studies have viewed integration processes from the perspective of the top executives of the 
acquiring firm. We include both employees and managers in our study, take the perspective of 
both target and acquiring firm, and do so over time. This might have provided a more nuanced 
insight into the value creation process in an acquisition. As Multifirm, Datagon and Teknico 
respondents confirm the serendipitous value created in the integration of Teknico, but not 
Datagon, we feel more confident in our findings. We argue for the inclusion of employees in 
post-acquisition research, as they give better real accounts for value creation, with better 
examples than the more general impressions of value given by managers.   
Our findings have two clear managerial insights. First, acquisition managers should be more 
open to identity threats. This means that they must acknowledge that target employees are proud 
of their past affiliations and feel that their solutions are superior to those of the acquiring firm. 
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Instead of pushing for a quick and seamless integration, firms should more carefully hire and 
train integration managers that can live with some disruptions and conflict.  
Secondly, target managers have a very important role in value creation in acquisitions. Our study 
shows that even if firms physically integrate, target managers may provide social and cultural 
autonomy that facilitate action, as well as support and structures that help these actions get 
implemented into the new organization. Acquirers must therefore be willing to give 
responsibilities to target managers and allow them to carefully nurture target employees.   
This paper is based on early impressions of the integration processes of two units in an IT 
company. The cases demonstrated strong effects from identity threats on serendipitous value 
creation and employee satisfaction. Further studies should, however, examine the 
generalizability of our findings to other types of firms, types of acquisitions and industries as 
well as look deeper into the possible long term negative effects of identity threats in 
organizations.    
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TABLE 2 
Possible validity threats and measures applied to limit these 
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TABLE 3 
Triggers of identity threats: Identity orientation and status 
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Target contribution: Mobilizing and mitigating actions 
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TABLE 5 
Acquisition outcomes: Serendipitous value and employee satisfaction 
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FIGURE 1 
Timeline of the acquisitions and the study observation period 
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FIGURE 2 
The structure of the data 
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FIGURE 3 
Proposed relationships between the concepts 
 
 
 
  
